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The Role and Powers of the Queen in the 2019 Brexit Parliamentary Crises – 
Reflections from British and Commonwealth History 
 
Abstract: This article assesses the role and powers of the Queen as Head of State during the 
political crises surrounding Brexit and the prorogation of parliament in 2019.  These crises in 
Westminster highlighted the lack of contemporary awareness of the Queen’s constitutional 
capacities and constraints in such tense political conditions.  A consequence of this was widespread 
confusion and ignorance regarding the use of the prerogative powers by both the Queen as Head 
of State and the Prime Minister as Head of Government.  It seeks to show the importance of 
understanding the Queen’s position as a political actor rather than a purely ceremonial one by 
drawing on modern British and Commonwealth history. 
  
Keywords: Brexit, Monarchy, Heads of State, Parliament, Political Crisis, British History, 
Commonwealth History, British Constitution, United Kingdom 
 
When Harry Truman told George VI in July 1945, ‘You’ve had a Revolution’, after the 
Labour landslide, the King replied to the US president: ‘Oh No! We don’t have those over here’.1 
This conveyed the sense that Britain was different.  There was indeed a belief in the postwar United 
Kingdom that constitutional crises happened elsewhere.  In this line of thinking, it was almost 
uniformly accepted that the monarch had no role in the constitution beyond the ceremonial.  
Politically, the monarch is there to follow the advice of the prime minister and cabinet. Law 
scholar, Robert Blackburn, argued in 2013 a common judgement among British academics that 
‘The Queen has set the gold standard for how a royal Head of State should perform his or her role 
in modern times’.2 Similarly, Peter Hennessy in the latest volume of his acclaimed history of 
postwar Britain, includes ‘the exemplary constitutional monarchy of Elizabeth II’ on the list of 
Britain’s post-war ‘pessimism breakers’.3  By this they mean that the Queen in Britain has largely 
avoided intervening in politics, not daring to exercise her prerogative powers, other than on the 
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advice of ministers.  Winston Churchill’s high adulatory veneration toward the Crown was 
qualified by his belief that the fundamental principle of the constitution was the ‘supremacy of 
Parliament over the crown’, which meant it was the ‘duty of the sovereign to act in accordance 
with advice’.  A contrary understanding from the Head of State would be dangerous.  As the 
devoted monarchist Churchill told his friend, the forsaken Duke of Windsor, ‘when our kings are 
in conflict with our constitution, we change our kings’, as was the case in 1688 and 1936.4     The 
Queen in the conventional British academic and political view has concentrated on the ceremonial 
aspects of the Head of State position and scrupulously carried out her public duties in harmony 
with the Government.  
 
The 2019 Brexit Parliamentary Crisis  
The political crises of 2019, especially after the change in the prime ministership from 
Theresa May to Boris Johnson, has shattered some of the assumptions surrounding the Sovereign’s 
constitutional and political role.  This context has arisen due to prolonged divisions and turmoil 
following the June 2016 referendum that resulted in a “Yes” to Brexit, namely the withdrawal of 
Britain’s membership of the European Union.  This subject has caused political crises across the 
institutions of government, as well as in society at large, in a manner not seen in British politics 
for decades.  The inability of Parliament in concert with the government to find a working majority 
behind a single approach of effecting Brexit, along with the restrictions of the Fixed Term 
Parliament Act 2011, have disrupted the smoothness and efficiency of the “Queen-in-Parliament” 
constitution, whereby an Executive by virtue of having a majority in the popularly elected House 
of Commons could transform its political programme and policies into law.  It is beyond the scope 
or interest of this article to interrogate the rights and wrongs of Brexit.  Neither does it aim to 
address the decision to prorogue parliament between 9 September and 14 October 2019 and 
subsequently for that decision to be declared “unlawful” by the Supreme Court on 24 September 
2019 with the result that parliament resumed.5  What does concern this article, however, is the way 
that the political crisis brought attention upon the constitutional and political role of the Head of 
State in the United Kingdom in a way that has not been seen for over a century since the 
parliamentary crises of 1909-14. These, it must be remembered, were of a greater magnitude and 
importance than Brexit.6  Headlines, rhetoric, protests and political actions occurred in 2019 that 
revived the dormant idea in Britain that the Head of State was a part of the constitutional and 
political process.  Senior figures on both sides of the Brexit debate made open calls for the Queen 
to get involved in politics and use her constitutional powers to intervene.   There was, for example, 
serious discussion among Brexit supporting ministers and members of parliament that if a bill was 
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passed by parliament that was not in line with the government’s wishes, then the Queen should be 
advised to withhold the Royal Assent and thereby prevent it having any force.7   While those who 
wanted Britain to remain in the European Union urged the Queen to dismiss the prime minister 
for various reasons.  These included not stepping down in the event of losing a vote of no 
confidence, receiving the verdict of the Supreme Court that went against the Government’s belief 
it had acted legally in proroguing parliament, misleading the Queen as Head of State with ‘unlawful’ 
advice on the prorogation, and potentially breaking the law.  On the reasonings of both sides of 
debate by judges, politicians and journalists it is perhaps worthy to be reminded of H. V. Evatt’s 
comment some eighty years ago that the powers of the British constitution are ‘befogged by 
conflicting authority’.8   
 The prorogation incited headlines and comments that have been seldom seen in 
contemporary Britain and once again the powers of the Crown and role of the Head of State were 
central to the tension and debate.  The Sun pronounced ‘Hey Big Suspender’ (The Sun, 29 August 
2019) on the prime minister advising prorogation in August; the Financial Times had ‘Boris Johnson 
denies misleading the Queen’ (Financial Times, 12 September 2019) when the Supreme Court’s 
verdict came through in September; while in the aftermath of both events the New Statesman 
proclaimed in early October: ‘Why the Queen could sack Boris Johnson as Prime Minister’ (New 
Stateman, 9 October 2019). The former Conservative Attorney-General, Dominic Grieve, insisted 
that if Boris Johnson did not comply with the law asking him to seek an extension to the Brexit 
negotiations, then the Queen would dismiss him: ‘He’ll be out in five minutes’ (The Independent, 30 
September 2019).  As if to give credence to such matters a ‘well placed source’ told respected 
journalist, Ian Birrell, that ‘The Queen had, for the first time in her reign, sought advice on sacking 
a prime minister before the Supreme Court verdict’ (INews, 29 September 2019). With a steadfast 
dedication to heighten the crisis it was also leaked from high sources that Boris Johnson ‘will dare 
the Queen to sack him rather than resign as prime minister in an attempt to drive through Brexit 
on October 31, cabinet ministers have revealed’ (Sunday Times, 6 October 2019). The prorogation 
of parliament, normally a procedural and routine part of the parliamentary calendar, had in this 
exercise in September 2019 provoked fierce and divisive reactions from across the political (and 
academic) spectrum.9   
     The idea that the prime minister would prorogue parliament during a time of agitated 
parliamentary and political debate over Brexit offended the constitutional sensibilities of many.  
On the day the prorogation request was made and granted, Lord Hennessy dramatically intoned 
on the BBC – ‘At 12 noon on Wednesday August 28 in the library at Balmoral Castle the ‘good 
chap’ theory of government fell in fragments at the feet of Her Majesty the Queen’ (Sunday Times, 
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8 September 2019).   There were some in civil society and politics who believed the monarch 
would refuse or delay the prorogation request.  Naomi Smith, chief executive of ‘Best for Britain’, 
an organisation whose objective is to prevent Brexit, stated within hours of Johnson’s request to 
the Queen to suspend parliament. 
 
It would make no sense for the Queen to back this deeply undemocratic, unconstitutional 
and fundamentally political manoeuvre from the government.  If the Queen is asked to 
help, she would do well to remember history doesn’t look too kindly on royals who aid 
and abet the suspension of democracy (The Guardian, 28 August 2019). 
 
Not long after Smith’s statement, news emerged that the Queen had assented to the 
request to prorogue almost immediately on receiving it.  This prompted the Labour MP, Kate 
Osamor, a former Shadow International Development Secretary, after news the order had been 
signed: ‘The. Queen. Did. Not. Save. Us.’ She later added with reference to King Constantine II 
of Greece’s acceptance of the 1967 military coup against the sitting civilian government: ‘The 
Queen should look at what happened to her cousin Tino ex King of Greece when you enable a 
right wing coup! Monarchy abolished!’.10  In mitigation, there were many commentators including 
the BBC’s Royal Correspondent stating on the same day of 28 August 2019 that ‘It would have 
been impossible for the Queen to turn down the prime minister’s request’ (BBC, 28 August 2019).  
The recently retired Law Lord, Jonathan Sumption, also proclaimed later that evening on the 
current affairs programme, Newsnight, that the Queen had no choice as she has ‘no source of advice 
independent of the government, she is bound to take the government’s advice’ (Newsnight, 28 
August 2019).  Some British establishment voices disagreed with that view.  Lord Armstrong, 
Cabinet Secretary 1979-87, argued earlier in June 2019 that prorogation over avoiding scrutiny and 
debate over Brexit could incapacitate Parliament’s ‘rights or duties’ forcing the Queen into 
intervention.  
 
If the Sovereign received a proposal, or advice, to prorogue Parliament and had reason to 
believe or suspect that the purpose was to frustrate Parliament from exercising its rights 
or duties, she might think it necessary to seek other advice as to whether she should accept 
or query the advice, or even decline to comply with it (Evening Standard, 7 June 2019). 
 
Perhaps the nonagenarian Armstrong had such a view, since as a young Civil Servant he wrote a 
memorandum in March 1974 as Principal Private Secretary to the prime minister on the options 
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available to the Queen and civil service in the event of a hung parliament where advice to the 
monarch could be fluid and contested.11  
The Queen’s Speech on 14 October also intensified a feeling that all was not well with the 
British constitution.  Normally this Speech from the Throne is nothing more than a regular 
occasion where the Queen outlines the government’s programme,  On this occasion however one 
parliamentary sketch writer believed the sovereign ‘looked both frail and furious’ (The Guardian, 14 
October 2019) and as others commented at a time of volatile passions the traditional phrase of the 
Sovereign: “My Government” for what is in fact the Government’s, and not the Queen’s 
programme seemed especially incongruous.12 For bringing in the monarch into such treacherous 
political waters the Leader of the Opposition, Jeremy Corbyn, who has unhidden republican 
sympathies, argued that the prime minister ‘should apologise to her [the Queen] for the advice he 
gave her…’ (The Independent, 25 September 2019).  The Union itself came into question across the 
component parts of the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland where the Queen has a special 
cultural and constitutional compact. Even when advocating independence, the position of the 
Scottish National Party has generally been one where the 1603 Union of Crowns would enable a 
state where ‘On independence Her Majesty the Queen would remain Head of State in Scotland’ 
and of United Kingdoms in ‘monarchical and social Union’.13 In the aftermath of the 2019 crises 
this assumption cannot be taken for granted. 
Soothed by decades of security and peace the British were from June 2016 awakened to a 
very different political reality. Perhaps, aside from the seriousness and drama of the political issues 
facing both Head of State and Head of Government, there is some explanation to be found in 
those Lord Palmerston termed “Her Majesty’s irresponsible advisers” of the courtiers surrounding 
the Queen’s great-great grandmother.14  These advisers at Buckingham Palace and at Downing 
Street while having official and quasi-official standing such as the Queen’s Private Secretary, the 
Cabinet Secretary or the Special Adviser to the prime minister, Dominic Cummings, have 
conspicuous influence on their masters and are intimate with their opinions and choices without 
being accountable to parliament or holding elected office.  Traditionally, these most senior officials 
surrounding the monarch and prime minister are there to act as not only as shock absorbers, but 
also to discuss, intimate and sometimes negotiate the management of controversial political and 
constitutional issues and thereby avert surprise and political crisis.15  It seems in 2019 that this 
concert of officials and advisers were unable or unwilling to do this.  However, in the end it is 
those that are formally ‘responsible’ – the Head of State and Head of Government – for any 
actions taken in their name.  Another critical element to the 2019 episode is as Vernon Bogdanor 
argued in his 1995 constitutional and historical survey of the monarchy that the advice the 
JICH 2020  H. Kumarasingham 
 6 
Sovereign has received from her British prime ministers has seldom been ‘improperly’ given16. 
Therefore, the Queen in the United Kingdom has avoided the difficulty till 2019 of facing highly 
controversial advice regarding the use of the prerogative. 17  At the end of August 1959, 
Conservative prime minister, Harold Macmillan, thinking of prorogation and dissolution, recorded 
in his diary that he wanted to go to Balmoral in person to make the request of the Sovereign so 
that the country could go to the polls: ‘I rather want to keep the Queen’s prerogative in its 
integrity’.18  Sixty years later, almost to the day, the integrity of the power to prorogue was 
undoubtedly in question under his successor in the late summer of 2019.   
Forty years earlier in 1979 the former Conservative thinker and lord chancellor, Quentin 
Hailsham, wrote a foreword to Sir John Kerr’s memoirs, that highlight the political responsibilities 
of the Crown’s powers.  Kerr, had infamously as the Queen’s Representative and governor-general 
in Australia dramatically sacked the Labor prime minister Gough Whitlam in November 1975.  
Hailsham believed the Kerr did the right thing and speculated on lessons for the both the Crown 
and British politicians from the episode.   
 
Though it be the business of British statesmen to avoid a situation which may bring reserve 
powers into action, the Crown cannot avoid its obligations…[when politicians try to abuse 
them, especially without the sanction of parliament].        
 
Hailsham continued that if Edward Heath in March 1974 had not resigned when unable to form 
a government or if James Callaghan in 1978 could not carry the Speech from the Throne, then the 
Queen ‘would have been forced to dismiss’ her British prime ministers. 19   Kerr’s actions in 1975 
jolted many by reminding that the Crown’s raw political power could not be forgotten and nor 
should the Head of State’s role in crisis be presumed to be one of ceremonial inaction.     
The Queen’s private secretary, Sir Martin Charteris, explained to Sir Anthony Malmo, the 
governor-general of Malta, in the mid 1970s ‘For a Constitutional Monarch, the only possible cause 
of embarrassment is to be asked to act unconstitutionally’.20 Arguably any advice that threatens the 
accepted Rule of Law or that advances of ‘legislative impropriety’ invites the contemplation of 
using reserve powers to avoid not only embarrassment but major breaches of constitutional 
convention.  While the ominous Norman French formula of the Sovereign’s veto “La Reyne se 
avisera” (The Queen will think about it) has not been used at Westminster since 1707, there are 
instances where ‘private protest’ from the Head of State has proved more effective, and could yet 
be still used, to thwart political actions behind the scenes than any formal public refusal.21 At the 
least the Sovereign’s power to query actions and policies of Her Government is acknowledged. 
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The House of Commons Public Administration Committee reported in 2004 that certain 
discretionary powers should ‘remain in the Sovereign’s hands’ that are ordinarily used on the advice 
of the government.  The Head of State, they argued, has the facility ‘in (grave constitutional crisis) 
to act contrary to or without Ministerial advice’.22  Fifteen years later, in the late summer of 2019, 
was the prorogation a ‘grave constitutional crisis’ that could have justified the Sovereign’s 
intervention? 
 
Select Commonwealth Precedents and Contexts 
 
British experts have generally taken a position of near deferential constitutional chivalry 
towards the Queen, whereby any contemplation involving the Head of State in politics or crises 
was ungallant and unthinkable.  While this may well be the ideal, the reality is that beyond 
ceremony a Head of State when crises arise must be prepared, and the political system also, for 
them to potentially enter the political realm. In essence today’s ‘High Priests’ of the mysterious 
British constitution23, unlike their predecessors, prior to the 2019 crisis at Westminster, have been 
lulled into relegating the royal Head of State to glorious constitutional isolationism whereby any 
political touch would contaminate the royal person.  The other tendency from experts in Britain 
is being blind to the monarch having any political powers and or constitutional role.    Indeed, if 
British specialists were more acquainted with the Queen’s Commonwealth roles, they would see 
that she has been Head of State during invasions, coups and civil wars. She has reigned as Head 
of State over governments that have encompassed military, Marxist-Leninist and Muslim 
foundations.  She has witnessed a diversity of politics and has unparalleled experience of a variety 
of policies, ideologies and contested situations.  In arguing the need for the Queen to be removed 
from crises there is the corollary question of what is the constitutional point of a Head of State if 
they have no role to play when a political crisis ensues.  They become less guardian and more 
garden gnome of the constitution – a silent decorative observer.  As a recent collection I have 
edited shows, covering not just the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, but 
especially the post-colonial world, the Queen has had more experience and knowledge of political 
crises than almost any other Head of State in history due to the Commonwealth dimension of her 
reign. 24  In fact Elizabeth II since 1952 has a tally of almost two hundred men and women serving 
her as prime minister from across the independent realms of the Commonwealth.25   She has even 
had to face effective abdication.  In accepting the governor-general’s resignation in 1987 following 
two military coups in Fiji, the Queen had effectively abdicated as Tui Viti, ‘Monarch of the Fijians’, 
an act which her British prime minister, Margaret Thatcher, ‘thought was an awful thing to have 
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done’, but had no power to advise differently or stop it since these were the affairs of the Fijian 
Queen and her advisors.26  Indeed, as the episode shows Elizabeth II has seen many actual coups 
in contrast to the United Kingdom despite recent rhetoric presuming otherwise.27 
From the evidence given in the Supreme Court case, it emerged that the Queen received 
‘a telephone call on 27th or 28th August’ from the prime minister, who ‘formally advised Her 
Majesty to prorogue Parliament’.28  In a 2015 interview Sir William Heseltine, deputy private 
secretary to the Queen during the 1975 Australian constitutional crisis was asked if the Queen 
would have accepted the advice by Gough Whitlam by phone to sack the governor-general, Sir 
John Kerr, who was fearing for his position.  Heseltine commented: ‘None of us [at Buckingham 
Palace] felt the Queen would have been bound to act on a telephone call without support in terms 
of a signed written submission from the Prime Minister’, a view concurred by the then private 
secretary, who added that ‘written notification would have been required’.29 And yet on an 
unspecified day in August 2019, a telephone call was sufficient to exercise the royal prerogative 
without written supporting evidence from the prime minister or disclosure of the memoranda 
prepared by law officers on the issue of prorogation.   
Beyond Britain, scholars such as Australian law professor, Anne Twomey, have signalled 
a different perspective from most British ones and stated that the Queen does in fact have options 
available to her and was not ‘bound’ to accept the prorogation advice.30 Derek O’Brien has also 
argued there are an array of cases and recent examples from the Caribbean on prorogation that 
can inform the present debate.31  Twomey has recently offered a major work of scholarship that 
brings a wealth of precedents not only for prorogation, but also the Crown’s reserve powers that, 
perhaps, British legal scholars will read. If they do they will see that many of their positions on 
both sides of the debate are either flawed or enhanced thanks to the verity and range of comparable 
Commonwealth precedents and laws.32  Twomey’s legal work speaks to the earlier pre-1945 
scholarship of H. V. Evatt and Eugene Forsey, who were the last to study seriously the Crown’s 
reserve and legal powers in the British Empire and Commonwealth.  It is perhaps no accident that 
Evatt and Forsey were from Australia and Canada respectively. Both countries have faced political 
crises involving the Crown and Head of Government.  As such this gave them a perspective to 
see the monarch and Crown in a multi-faceted light of wide British and oversea precedent, which 
their British counterparts have largely ignored, forgotten or have never had to engage with 
domestically.  As Twomey shows, rather than a monarch having no choice there are examples, 
especially from Canada and Australia, both at federal and state level, from the nineteenth century 
to the present that are worth revisiting where serious conditions were made by the Governor-
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General or Governor/Lieutenant-Governor on the ministry regarding prorogation that highlight 
different paths that could have been taken by the Queen at Balmoral on 28 August 2019.   
In situations like 2019 at Westminster where the parliamentary arithmetic is fluid and in 
consequence the government’s ability to advance its programme uncertain the parliamentary Head 
of State can legitimately ask for more assurances when asked to approve plans like proroguing 
parliament.  In such circumstances the ‘responsibility’ of the government – that being its ability to 
command the confidence of the elected chamber – is in question and therefore the Head of State 
must be vigilant.   The Canadian governor-general, Sir Edmund Head, for example, believed, that 
a ‘lack of proven responsibility of ministers gave him greater discretion in the matter of 
prorogation’33. This was arguably the case of Boris Johnson as his government lacked a majority 
and “proven” confidence from the House of Commons having lost almost all its parliamentary 
votes before December 2019 general election. This did not deter him, in fact it may have spurred 
his request to the Queen for a prorogation, which placed the responsibility of his advice to the 
Head of State in question at the very least.  During political crises like these there is always the 
power to simply ask questions without needing nuclear options such as dismissal or outright 
refusal.   The political crises in Canada, particularly in December 2008 when Stephen Harper 
advised the governor-general, Michaëlle Jean, to prorogue parliament in order to avoid the 
potential fate of being brought down by a coalition of opposition parties shows different ideas of 
how things could have happened in Britain in 2019. Here, the indications are that Jean, as the 
Queen’s Representative, not only kept Harper waiting before granting his request, but also 
stipulated conditions concerning the shortening of the time of prorogation and the condition that 
when parliament met again there should be an effective vote of no confidence immediately.34  As 
the Queen herself has said on another occasion regarding a less than attractive Honours List: 
‘Please remind the Prime Minister that there is always time to think again’.35 
Unstable parliamentary majorities over divisive international issues such as Brexit have 
compelled Parliamentary Heads of State to intervene. Governor-General Sir Patrick Duncan in 
South Africa on the heated policy of neutrality during World War II, favoured by the South African 
prime minister, General J. B. M. Hertzog, but opposed by the deputy prime minister and coalition 
partner, General Jan Smuts, refused a dissolution request in September 1939 from the prime 
minister since he believed a general election ‘in the present state of feelings would be the occasion 
of great bitterness – possibly of violence’. For the governor-general the fact that the country had 
had an election less than a year earlier when the issues in the debate had been aired was also an 
concern.  The Cabinet was split on the issue of war with an estimated five ministers for Hertzog 
and seven for Smuts’ position.  The executive and legislature were divided on the dramatic policy 
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of neutrality, with much in flux.    Hertzog’s ability to give responsible advice had also been 
disabled, owing to Smuts winning a parliamentary vote of eighty to sixty-seven in favour of war, 
which raised questions as to whether Hertzog could still command the confidence of the 
legislature.  Smuts was subsequently invited to form a government and South Africa joined the 
war.  Duncan was plagued with doubt as to whether he had done the right thing constitutionally 
and was faced with deep criticism, but in London the attorney-general, Sir Donald Somervell, 
argued that ‘in the very special circumstances’ the governor-general had acted legally and correctly.  
The governor-general’s actions eventually led to Hertzog’s leaving politics and consequently 
replaced by the more nationalist Afrikaans leadership of Daniel Malan who would in 1948 
electorally and politically end the South Africa of Jan Smuts.36   
In one of the more curious requests made to the Queen was one from the New Zealand 
Social Credit Party in March 1972 that asked her, in ‘the absence of any prior referendum or 
election’, to withhold assent to any ‘enabling legislation’ that would allow Britain’s entry into the 
European Economic Community destined to occur shortly thereafter.  They reminded the Queen 
that while she is Head of State of the United Kingdom, she is Head of many other states, including 
New Zealand, and as Head of the Commonwealth she has ‘an undisputed right to preserve this 
unique association of nations in the face of the concerted efforts of a present majority of 
Westminster parliamentarians to destroy it in all but name’.  By entering the Community these 
MPs are 
 
Engaged not only in a process of destroying the Commonwealth but of sacrificing British 
sovereignty, for a Commission of non-elective bureaucrats subservient to massive 
European financial consortiums.37 
 
The Queen’s reaction is not recorded.  Nonetheless, it gives an eccentric flavour of the sometime 




Yash Ghai and Jill Cottrell conclude their 1986 study of Pacific island Heads of State that 
have adopted a Westminster style constitution and parliamentary democracy with a critical 
observation on any British commonalities. 
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The truth is that the British experience is substantially irrelevant – for anywhere outside 
the UK.  The experience of other countries with written “Westminster type” constitutions 
may be a little more useful – not as the basis for predicting what might happen so much 
as making the point that one should not assume crises cannot happen.38 
 
The spectre of Parliamentary Heads of State across the post-colonial world should be used not 
only to inform other states from a comparable experience, but for the United Kingdom itself to 
understand the political powers of its own Head of State and position in government.  Harold 
Laski over eighty years ago argued that ‘the elasticity of the Crown’s powers leaves dangerous 
room for the differences between men over ends to cloud their judgement about the legitimacy of 
the means the Crown might be persuaded to invoke upon a critical occasion’.39  The problem in 
2019 was that few in the United Kingdom appreciated the different and legitimate options available 
to both Head of State and Head of Government.  I have recently attempted to revise Walter 
Bagehot’s attribution of Sovereign’s right to consult, encourage and warn, written over 150 years 
ago, with an analysis drawn from recent British and Commonwealth history to show how a 
Parliamentary Head of State can exercise the right to rule, uphold and oblige. In addition, 
experiences and ideas from across modern British and Commonwealth history have been used to 
build a conceptualisation of the position and powers of Heads of State in Britain and the 
postcolonial world.40  The year 2019 is unlikely to be remembered as an annus mirablis 
constitutionally or politically in the reign of Elizabeth II. As the year drew to a close the Queen 
herself described it as ‘quite bumpy’.41 The political crises at Westminster of 2019 have shown that 
the political powers and constitutional role of the Head of State in the United Kingdom should be 
studied more closely, especially in situations where the reserve powers can controversially be used 
in favour of a prime minister or against a prime minister.  Serious discord and uncertainty over the 
conventional roles and rights of both the Head of State and Head of Government can wreak 
havoc.  At the very least Westminster’s 2019 crises reminded all that the United Kingdom was not 






This article is a slightly amended version of my forthcoming chapter “Viceregalism at Westminster: The Role 
and Powers of the Queen in the 2019 Brexit Parliamentary Crisis” in Kumarasingham (ed.), Viceregalism - The 
Crown and its Representatives in Political Crises in the Postwar Commonwealth, Houndsmills, Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2020 
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